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The expansion model
of the major Chilean
retail chains
Álvaro Calderón Hoffmann
Chilean retail firms have succeeded in developing solid competitive 
advantages based on a business model that captures synergies from 
the joint operation of a number of related activities. This integrated 
retailing formula developed as a direct result of the intense competition 
in the Chilean market, whose limited size made it very difficult to achieve 
profitability in just one segment of the retail industry. The key to success 
has been to combine the best practices of international leaders with local 
knowledge, diversified provision that includes banking services, and the 
capacity for survival in a highly competitive market. Given all this, retailers 
have seen international expansion as the option most likely to set them 
upon a path of sustainable growth. 
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Economic Affairs Officer




C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 0  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 6150
THE EXPANSION MODEL OF THE MAJOR CHILEAN RETAIL CHAINS  •  ÁLVARO CALDERÓN HOFFMANN
Chile was a pioneer of economic reform (trade 
liberalization, deregulation and privatization) in Latin 
America. Following an initial period of turbulence, the 
country embarked on a course of vigorous growth that 
made it one of the best-performing economies in the 
region. In this renewed environment, local companies 
were forced to undergo profound restructuring. As a 
result, by the early 1990s, some of these companies 
were highly competitive in the local market. A 
number of sectors, including telecommunications, 
electricity generation and distribution, some segments 
of manufacturing, pension fund management companies 
(AFPs) and retailers, achieved significant competitive 
advantages. 
Some Chilean markets were starting to show 
signs of saturation by this stage, but new investment 
opportunities were emerging in other Latin American 
countries as a result of reforms initiated there. Thus, 
although Chilean companies were not as large as 
some of their Latin American competitors, their 
experience enabled them to embark upon ambitious 
internationalization plans, thereby overcoming the 
size limitations of their domestic market. Moreover, 
this process was boosted by the renewed financing 
opportunities —both local and foreign— available to 
the country’s largest firms. In fact, Chile became a sort 
of “recycling centre” for international funds (Calderón 
and Griffith-Jones, 1995).
In the second half of the 1990s, a good many 
Chilean companies sought to reproduce abroad the 
successes they had achieved in the domestic market. 
More than US$ 10 billion was invested during this 
period, most of it in South America and especially 
Argentina, Peru and, to a lesser extent, Brazil (figure 
1). Most of the early investments were made in the 
electricity sector through the acquisition of assets in 
the privatization processes taking place in neighbouring 
countries. These were followed by other investments in 
service activities, especially pension fund management, 
and in manufacturing. In the case of the latter, most of 
the activities concerned were natural resource-based, 
examples being food and beverages, wood pulp and 
paper, and metal manufacturing (table 1). By the end 
of the decade, a number of these firms had achieved 
a major regional presence. Nevertheless, some of the 
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TABLE 1
Main Chilean companies with investments abroad, by country, 2005a
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
 A B Company Sector Countries where company operatesb Sales
 AR PE BR MX OT US Total % abroad
 1 2 Empresa Nacional del Petróleo Oil X X   X  6 674 …
   (ENAP)
 2 3 Enersisc Electricity X X X  X  6 277 …
 3 4 Cencosud Retail X      4 915 32
 4 7 Falabella Retail X X   X  3 854 22
 5 9 Lan Airlines Transport X X X X X X 2 507 …
 6 12 Celulosa Arauco y Constitución Wood, pulp and paper X  X  X  2 377 …
   (ARAUCO)
 7 13 Compañía Manufacturera de Wood, pulp and paper X X  X X  2 130 11
   Papeles y Cartones (CMPC)
 8 14 Molymet Metal manufacturing    X X  2 090 …
 9 16 Compañía General de Electricity  X      1 663 10
   Electricidad (CGE)
 10 18 ENTEL Telecommunications  X   X X 1 496 16
 11 19 Ripley Corp.  Retail  X     1 475 25
 12 20 Farmacias Ahumada (FASA) Retail  X X X   1 230 60
 13 23 Compañía Cervecerías Unidas Beverages X      961 10
   (CCU)
 14 24 Embotelladora Andina Beverages X  X    934 52
 15 25 AES Generc Electricity  X X   X  899 …
 16 30 Masisac Wood, pulp and paper X  X X   744 73
 17 32 Manufacturas de Cobre (Madeco) Metal manufacturing X X X    713 39
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the companies and from Capital (2006) and América economía (2006a).
a Column A ranks the companies by their foreign investments and column B by their sales.
b AR: Argentina; PE: Peru; BR: Brazil; MX: Mexico; OT: Other Latin America; US: United States.
c Company taken over by a transnational enterprise.
and the AFPs— were taken over by transnational 
corporations seeking to quickly establish a substantial 
presence in Latin America. For many, too, lack of 
international experience, overconfidence and difficult 
conditions in the recipient economies resulted in losses 
that matched the original investments in size.
Thus, firms that decided to invest abroad had 
a difficult and unrewarding experience: they were 
taken over by competitors from outside the region 
or else ran up large losses. Despite the dynamism of 
the Chilean economy and the availability of low-cost 
financing, the country’s firms thus became warier of 
new attempts to expand abroad. At the same time, the 
corporate perception of the Latin American business 
climate rapidly deteriorated in the face of growing 
economic and political volatility in the neighbouring 
countries and reduced legal security for investments 
abroad (Calderón, 2005).
In an atmosphere of greater uncertainty, Chilean 
firms sought to strengthen their position in their home 
market and postponed many of their foreign investment 
ventures. In Argentina, in particular, but also in Peru, 
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companies set contingency plans in train and in some 
cases implemented radical financial and operational 
restructuring projects. They also worked to improve 
their efficiency locally, incorporating new technologies 
and innovative forms of management and seeking to 
generate renewed synergies. To this end, there was an 
intensive round of consolidation through mergers and 
acquisitions and alliances between operators in related 
businesses, which resulted in economies of scale and 
far-reaching integration. Currently, Chilean companies 
seem to be more selective and cautious when it comes 
to embarking upon an internationalization strategy.
Chilean investments abroad began to pick up again 
in 2003, coinciding with an upturn in the domestic 
economy (which grew by over 6% in 2004 and 2005) 
and a strong flow of financial resources as a result 
of robust growth in the world economy and buoyant 
prices for the country’s main exports (figure 1). Certain 
sectors started to look for new business opportunities 
in order to continue growing, and the limited size 
of the domestic economy meant that the prospect of 
investing abroad once again seemed appealing. This has 
not led to any significant change in internationalization 
patterns, as the same businesses and geographical 
destinations predominate. This trend has been greatly 
strengthened by economic recovery and the return to 
institutional normality in Argentina.
Just as the electricity sector led the way in the first 
wave, retail companies have clearly taken the lead in 
this new phase of Chilean investment abroad. These 
firms have learned from recent experience, refining 
a business model with clear competitive advantages 
and exporting it successfully to other countries in 
Latin America. Chilean firms have learned from the 
global giants of industry and adapted their experience 
to Latin American conditions, basing their competitive 
advantages on their management capabilities. While 
keeping a majority stake in their foreign affiliates, they 
have sought to operate as local firms in collaboration 
with strategic domestic partners, thereby limiting the 
exposure of capital exported from Chile. This is in 
contrast to the first phase of Chilean investment abroad, 
when this logic did not exist because markets were not 
yet sufficiently developed.
To summarize, the internationalization of Chilean 
firms has taken place within Latin America. Early 
reforms, the privatization of State enterprises and 
the experience accumulated in an open, competitive 
economy, together with geographical proximity and 
cultural affinity, gave these firms a major competitive 
advantage in initiating the international expansion of 
their activities and harnessing the opportunities that 
emerged in neighbouring countries. Initially, given 
the highly uncertain environment, this experience was 
crucial for competing with transnational corporations 
that were less familiar with Latin America. Nevertheless, 
these advantages dwindled rapidly, competitors became 
more familiar with the local environment and some 
of the Chilean firms that had been most active in this 
process were swallowed up by international operators. 
Now, after a lull, Chilean investments abroad have been 
making a comeback. Chilean firms have learned from 
their experience and developed business models that 
they can apply successfully abroad, retailing being the 
prime example.
II
The internationalization of retailing
In the mid-nineteenth century, there was a sharpening of 
the divide between the wholesale and retail trades in the 
United States and Europe. France saw the establishment 
of the great emporia that were the forerunners of 
today’s department stores, creating the retail trade as 
we know it today. Right from the start, large stores in 
Paris such as Galeries Lafayette had special sections 
for displaying their products, sales personnel whose 
task was to meet the needs of customers, and credit 
facilities. This model spread rapidly to other European 
countries. The first half of the twentieth century saw the 
advent in the United States of the supermarket and one 
of its emblematic features, the shopping trolley, which 
led to a veritable revolution in consumption patterns. 
In the early 1960s, new formats gave a fresh impetus 
to the retail industry; the French chain Carrefour 
opened the first hypermarket and shopping centres 
began to proliferate in the United States. These brought 
together department stores, boutiques, supermarkets 
and entertainment facilities (restaurants, cinemas, 
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etc.) under one roof. Powerful local operators began 
to consolidate in the different retail formats, and these 
developments were copied all over the world.
In Latin America, the progression was similar. 
Large stores started to make their appearance in 
the main cities of the region at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Subsequently, following the United 
States model, the first supermarkets appeared, followed 
shortly afterwards by hypermarkets and shopping 
centres. Generally speaking, the retail business was 
operated by local family-owned groups and its growth 
was quite fragmentary.
Retailers internationalized more slowly than firms 
in other industries. The first efforts in this direction 
were made by some of the major United States stores, 
such as Woolworth, which set up operations in Canada 
(1907) and later in Europe, and Sears Roebuck, which 
expanded into Cuba in 1942. In the 1960s, these 
initiatives were emulated by some of their peers on the 
other side of the Atlantic, including C&A of France 
and Marks & Spencer of the United Kingdom. Prior to 
that, most companies had largely confined their growth 
and diversification strategy to their local markets. 
Signs of saturation in these, however, together with 
regulatory changes and greater openness to foreign 
direct investment, prompted some large firms in the 
sector to seek out new growth opportunities abroad. The 
pioneers in the supermarket segment were European 
companies, led by Carrefour of France and Royal Ahold 
of the Netherlands.
The process started to gain greater momentum in 
the 1990s, especially with the emergence of the United 
States firm Wal-Mart. By 1990, less than thirty years 
after its foundation, Wal-Mart had already become the 
leading retail chain in the United States, thanks to an 
active strategy of acquisitions and consolidation of its 
format (discount or convenience stores). Thereafter, 
it set in motion an ambitious process of international 
expansion, combining greenfield investments with 
acquisitions and partnerships. Initially, its expansion 
was concentrated in North America (Mexico in 
1991, through a partnership with the local group 
Cifra, and Canada in 1994); then it set its sights on 
South America (Argentina and Brazil in 1995) before 
finally venturing into more distant markets in Europe 
(Germany in 1998 and the United Kingdom in 1999) 
and Asia (China in 1996, Republic of Korea in 1998 
and Japan in 2002). Wal-Mart has thus become the 
world’s leading retailer, with three times the turnover 
of its closest competitor (Carrefour), and is climbing 
towards the highest rankings in the classification of the 
world’s largest companies (the Global 500) prepared 
by Fortune magazine.
As the experience of Wal-Mart demonstrates, 
the international expansion of retail firms accelerated 
considerably in the second half of the 1990s, albeit 
only a few major players were involved. Moreover, 
this process did not only take place in industrialized 
countries (the United States, Western Europe and 
Japan), where it was boosted by the existence of the 
European Union and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, but also spread to a considerable number 
of developing economies, principally in Asia, Latin 
America, Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean area 
(figure 2 and table 2). With home markets close to 
saturation, several companies saw emerging economies, 
where the business model was largely underdeveloped, 
as a major opportunity for continued growth.1
Nevertheless, United States retailers dominate, 
accounting for 36% of the sales of the 250 largest 
companies in the industry, followed by European 
companies (35%) and those from Japan (16%) 
(Deloitte, 2006). As they expanded internationally, 
these companies’ operations abroad began to have a 
significant impact on total sales. Between 1996 and 
2003, the number of retailers ranking among the top 
100 transnationals worldwide increased from none to 
four: Carrefour, Wal-Mart, Royal Ahold and Metro of 
Germany (UNCTAD, 1998, pp. 36-38 and 2005, pp. 
267-269). As outside companies began to enter their 
own markets, however, domestic performance was held 
back and none of these companies has emerged as a 
clear winner across all regions or markets (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2003).
Thanks to the reforms and the promising economic 
outlook in its principal countries, Latin America 
became one of the regions where industry leaders 
with global ambitions had the greatest potential for 
international expansion (figure 2).2 The region thus 
1 At the beginning of the current decade, Royal Ahold owned a chain 
of stores with operations in Western and Eastern Europe, North 
America, Central and South America and South-East Asia; Carrefour 
had a strong presence in Europe, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East 
and Africa; and Wal-Mart had operations in the Americas, Western 
Europe and East Asia.
2 In 1995, five Latin American countries ranked among the 20 most 
attractive destinations for retail development. At that time, Asia had 
10 countries on the list, Eastern Europe four and the Mediterranean 
area just one (A.T. Kearney, 2005).
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FIGURE 2
Developing country markets with the greatest retail potential, by region, 1995-2006
(Percentages) a
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of A.T. Kearney (various years).
a Percentage of markets that are among the 20 most attractive destinations for retail development.
TABLE 2
World’s leading retailers, by sales, 2004
(Millions of dollars)
 Firm Country of origin  Total salesa Regions outside home country where it operatesb
 NA LA EU AS OT
 1 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. United States  285 222 X X X X
 2 Carrefour S.A. France 89 568  X X X X
 3 The Home Depot Inc. United States  73 094 X Xc  
 4 Metro AG Germany 69 781   X X X
 5 Tesco PLC United Kingdom  62 505   X X X
 6 Kroger Co. United States  56 434    
 7 Costco Wholesale Corp.  United States  47 146 X Xc X X
 8 Target Corp.  United States 45 682    
 9 Royal Ahold N.V. Netherlands 44 793 X  X 
 10 Aldi GMBH & Co. Germany 42 906 X  X  X
 228 Falabella Chile 2 608  X  
 239 D&S S.A. Chile 2 420
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Stores (2006).
a Group turnover in the retail segment.
b NA: North America (United States and Canada); LA: Latin America and the Caribbean; EU: Western and Eastern Europe; AS: Asia;
 OT: Others.
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rapidly became a priority target for the major retail 
operators (figure 3). Through an aggressive strategy 
that consisted essentially in buying up local chains, 
Wal-Mart, Carrefour and Royal Ahold rapidly built 
up solid positions in the region’s major markets 
(Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), taking their place 
among the principal transnationals with operations in 
the region and becoming leaders in the Latin American 
retail industry. 
Despite barriers to entry, these major markets 
offered the companies sufficient economies of scale 
for them to gradually introduce the formats developed 
in their countries of origin. In Brazil, the retail trade 
was very fragmentary, had low operating margins and 
needed a great deal of investment; it also faced intense 
competition from the informal sector, which made 
foreign capital inflows into the industry very valuable. 
This led to a high level of penetration by international 
operators, especially Carrefour and Casino of France, 
Sonae of Portugal, Royal Ahold of the Netherlands and, 
more recently, Wal-Mart. In Mexico, on the other hand, 
where local operators were in a better position, Wal-
Mart entered the market through a partnership which 
gave it a better understanding of the preferences and 
needs of the country’s consumers. Subsequently, the 
United States firm took control of the operation3 and 
applied an aggressive strategy centred on pricing and the 
transfer of best practices, which resulted in a significant 
FIGURE 3
Latin America: Most attractive markets for the retail industry
(Country ranking among the 30 most attractive emerging markets)a
Source: Prepared by the author using information from A.T. Kearney (various years).
a A.T. Kearney publishes an index on global prospects for the retail trade in developing countries. This analysis is meant to help international 
operators to prioritize their global strategies. The index is constructed on the basis of variables associated with country risk, attractiveness, 
market saturation and the time required to take advantage of the opportunity. The end result is an annual classification that ranks the 30 
main emerging economies by their investment potential.
3 In 1997, Wal-Mart paid US$ 1.2 billion to acquire the Cifra group’s 
share of their joint operation in Mexico.
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increase in competition in the Mexican market. This 
experience enabled Wal-Mart to intensify and speed 
up its expansion in Latin America, particularly Brazil, 
where it took over the assets of Royal Ahold and 
Sonae.4 In 2004, Wal-Mart was in third place among the 
50 largest transnational corporations with operations in 
Latin America, surpassed only by General Motors and 
Telefónica of Spain, while Carrefour ranked thirteenth 
(ECLAC, 2006, p. 42).
Expansion into the smaller Latin American 
economies was more limited during this period, with 
Royal Ahold being practically the only significant 
participant. In 1998, after entering the Brazilian market, 
the Dutch firm went into partnership with the Argentine 
group Velox (owners of the Disco and Santa Isabel 
supermarket chains), gaining simultaneous access to 
the markets of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Peru. 
The following year, even as it was embarking upon 
ambitious growth in the United States, Royal Ahold set 
its sights on Central America. Using the same strategy 
as it had applied in the Southern Cone, it formed a 
company with the Guatemalan firm La Fragua, which 
already had operations in El Salvador and Honduras. 
It subsequently expanded the partnership to include the 
Corporación de Supermercados Unidos (CSU) of Costa 
Rica, thus creating the largest supermarket network 
in the subregion, Central America Retail Holding 
Company (CARHC).5 In 2002, Royal Ahold took control 
of operations in South America. In early 2003, however, 
the Dutch group ran into serious financial difficulties 
and publicly admitted to accounting irregularities. 
Under these circumstances, and faced with the 
deteriorating economic situation in the Southern Cone, 
Royal Ahold announced its withdrawal from Latin 
America, thereby opening up new opportunities for 
other companies that wished to expand their presence 
in the region. Its most valuable Latin American assets 
were acquired by just two companies: Wal-Mart and 
the emerging Chilean group Cencosud (table 3).6
TABLE 3
Latin America: Leading international retail chains, their turnover and their market 
position, 2005
(Millions of dollars)
 Regional leaders Emerging operators
 Wal-Mart Stores Carrefour Cencosud Falabella
 Sales Position Sales Position Sales Position Sales Position
Argentina … … 538 4 1 743 1 144 …
Brazil 5 032 3 5 394 2 - - - -
Chile - - - - 4 915 1 3 854 2
Colombia - - 751 3 - - - -
Mexico 15 518 1 a - - - - -
Peru - - - - - - 404 3
Central America 2 200 1 - - - - - -
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the companies and América economía (2006).
a In March 2005, Carrefour sold its assets in Mexico to the local chain Chedraui for an estimated US$ 500 million.
4 In 1995, Wal-Mart moved into the Brazilian market though a 
partnership with the local chain Lojas Americanas, opening a couple 
of discount stores. Two years later, the partnership was dissolved and 
Wal-Mart started a slow process of organic growth, opening 25 new 
outlets. Recently, the process has accelerated considerably thanks 
to new acquisitions from some of its leading global competitors. 
In March 2004, Wal-Mart bought the Bompreço chain for some 
US$ 300 million from the Netherlands company Royal Ahold; this 
brought it 118 stores in north-eastern Brazil. In December 2005, 
Wal-Mart paid US$ 748 million for the Brazilian operations of the 
Portuguese firm Sonae, thus positioning itself, with 295 stores in 17 
of Brazil’s 26 states, as the third-largest retail chain in the country
 behind Carrefour and Companhia Brasileira de Distribuiçao (CBD), 
which has the backing of the French group Casino (The Wall Street 
Journal Americas, 2005).
5 Royal Ahold controlled 33.3% of CARHCO, which in turn owned 
85% of La Fragua and 100% of CSU. By 2005, CARHCO was 
operating 363 stores in Costa Rica (124), Guatemala (120), El 
Salvador (57), Honduras (32) and Nicaragua (30).
6 Wal-Mart acquired the Brazilian chain Bompreço and Royal Ahold’s 
share of the Central American supermarket chain CARHCO. Cencosud 
bought the Santa Isabel chain in Chile and the Disco supermarkets 
in Argentina.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 0  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 6 157
THE EXPANSION MODEL OF THE MAJOR CHILEAN RETAIL CHAINS  •  ÁLVARO CALDERÓN HOFFMANN
As can be seen from the experience of Royal 
Ahold, it has not been easy for large retailers to expand 
into foreign markets, since good results at home are 
no guarantee of success abroad (Bianchi and Ostalé, 
2004, p. 3). Moreover, the “windows of opportunity” 
opening up in developing countries were associated 
with a high degree of uncertainty, owing to the rapid 
saturation and instability of local markets (figure 2). 
Latin America has been no exception, and Royal 
Ahold is not the only transnational corporation to 
have pulled out of the region. Other emblematic cases 
include The Home Depot (Argentina and Chile) and 
Carrefour (Chile and Mexico). In most such situations, 
the international operators in question proved unable to 
adapt their formats and practices to the characteristics 
of local markets and faced unexpected problems with 
suppliers, consumer tastes and aggressive competition 
from established local chains.
In summary, the dominant international operators, 
Wal-Mart and Carrefour, have concentrated on 
consolidating their position in the main regional markets. 
They have recently sought to expand their presence into 
smaller markets, with mixed results. On the whole, 
consolidation in the smaller economies has taken place 
among local firms, which have been incorporating 
some of the best practices and formats developed by 
the global operators. Chile’s experience is particularly 
striking, since the local chains put up fierce resistance 
to the global leaders, consolidated their position in the 
domestic market and then ventured out to explore new 
business opportunities in neighbouring countries. This 
last development is especially noteworthy, since not 
even the large Mexican chains (Organización Soriana, 
Controladora Comercial Mexicana, Grupo Gigante and 
Grupo Elektra), which have competed strongly with 
Wal-Mart, have been able to expand their activities 
abroad to any significant degree. 
III
The integrated retail model in Latin America
Retail is one of the most dynamic and competitive sectors 
of the Chilean economy, and is in a state of unceasing 
development. This has made the Chilean market the 
most attractive in Latin America (figure 3). In recent 
years, there has been a trend towards consolidation of 
the different formats that compete for custom in the 
sector: supermarkets, specialized chains (pharmacies, 
home improvement and building materials) and 
department stores. A greater diversification of income 
sources has now become explicit, essentially involving 
the provision of customer credit and the sale of a 
broader range of products at the same location in order 
to attract more consumers (banking services, insurance 
and travel). Many of these changes have occurred 
against the backdrop of profound transformations in 
the sector’s largest companies, especially the transition 
from family businesses to professionally managed firms 
and then to public companies whose shares are traded 
on stock markets in Chile and abroad.
With a more open economy and growing 
competition following the arrival of the first international 
operators, retail companies adopted a defence strategy 
which yielded good results. First, they were quick to 
study the top international retailers. Then they took 
some of those retailers’ business models and practices, 
pinpointed and eliminated their shortcomings and 
proceeded to adapt them to the local market. They 
also hired executives with ties to those companies and 
added new products and services. For their part, the 
foreign corporations underestimated the local firms’ 
ability to react and ultimately had to withdraw from the 
Chilean market7 (Bianchi and Ostalé, 2004). The sector 
thus saw the emergence of a group of companies that 
had developed competitive advantages, enabling them 
to establish a strong position in the domestic market, 
block international competitors’ attempts to enter the 
Chilean market and begin to expand into neighbouring 
countries (table 4).
7 In 1999, after operating for five years without making a profit, 
the largest United States department store chain, J.C. Penney, sold 
its assets to its local competitor, Almacenes París. In 2001, three 
years after it began trading, the world’s biggest home improvement 
store, The Home Depot, decided to sell its out to its local partner, 
Falabella. In 2003, after five years in the country, the world’s largest 
supermarket chain, Carrefour, sold its stores to the local operator 
D&S. Lastly, in the same year, Cencosud acquired the operations 
of Royal Ahold in Chile.
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One of the main peculiarities of Chilean retailers is 
their involvement with financial services.8 Chilean firms 
were pioneers in consumer lending. The development 
of the sector has been closely linked to the provision 
of customer credit, boosted by the creation of the 
retailers’ own financial arms: Banco Falabella (1998), 
Banco Ripley (2003) and Banco París (2004). Indeed, 
meeting customer demand for credit has become an 
additional source of revenue and a key factor in these 
companies’ profitability. Consumer credit activities 
have strengthened the retail side of the business and the 
success of this has boosted lending in turn, generating a 
powerful synergy between the two activities (Falabella, 
2004b, p. 27). Lending activities could become even 
more important at times of economic slowdown, since 
people would then prefer longer repayment terms. The 
financial business currently represents between 7% 
and 10% of total income for Cencosud and Falabella, 
and about 25% for Ripley, which is not yet in the 
supermarket business. Moreover, it provides companies 
with information on their customers (consumption 
habits and borrowing capacity) that helps them to define 
their marketing strategies and optimize the composition 
of the goods they sell and their promotional activities. 
It would appear that the present focus of strategy is on 
increasing the loyalty of existing customers rather than 
attracting new ones. Thus, lending could be increased 
further by providing more credit to the best customers 
without necessarily increasing risk.9
The provision of credit cards by retailers was not 
formerly subject to many restrictions, and in some 
cases this led to complaints by users. In April 2006, a 
new law was brought in to govern the operation and 
use of non-bank credit cards, bringing them under 
the supervision of the Superintendency of Banks 
and Financial Institutions (SBIF).10 Although these 
changes in the regulatory framework could affect their 
capacity to generate operational flows, the companies 
in the sector seem to be adapting rapidly to this more 
restrictive environment. As part of this, they have 
improved their credit profile forecasting models and 
tightened up their bad debt provision policies.
TABLE 4
Chile: Leading retail groups and their market share, 2005
(Percentages)
Group Department stores Home improvement Supermarkets Pharmacies
Falabella 40 21 3 -
Cencosud 29 5 25 -
Ripley 31 - - -
D&S - - 35 4
Farmacias Ahumada (FASA) - - - 30
Salcobrand - - - 27
Cruz Verde - - - 34
Others 0 74 37 5
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Prepared by the author with information from the companies.
8 This strategy had already been applied by United States companies. 
In Chile, however, it proved particularly successful, since the major 
stores’ credit cards were targeted at lower-income consumers, a 
segment clearly not covered by traditional banks.
9 In December 2005, the main retailers had loan portfolios totalling 
more than US$ 3.15 billion: Falabella, US$ 1.072 billion; Ripley, 
US$ 907 million; Cencosud, US$ 428 million; D&S, US$ 374 
million; and La Polar, US$ 374 million (La Segunda, 2006).
10 Under the new regulations, customers who have problems with their 
card, be they irregularities in the commissions charged or security 
anomalies, can complain to SBIF or the National Consumer Service 
(SERNAC). The companies are obliged to provide customers with 
information on the item for which interest is being charged, the rate 
applied, the basis of calculation and the period covered.
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In the absence of international operators in 
Chile, local companies competed vigorously with one 
another in areas ranging from hypermarkets to the 
more innovative types of convenience store. Economic 
growth and stability, together with strong consumption 
growth, enabled the leading firms to continue expanding 
without significant losses of market share. Nevertheless, 
the first signs of saturation prompted the Chilean chains 
to seek new growth opportunities abroad.
The pioneer in international expansion was 
Cencosud. During the 1980s, it opened two shopping 
centres with Jumbo hypermarkets in Buenos Aires; 
one of them, Unicenter, was the largest of its kind in 
Argentina. These initial incursions set what was to 
become the pattern for Cencosud’s internationalization 
drive: a combination of vigorous real-estate development 
(construction and operation of shopping centres) and 
active participation in retail activities, particularly 
supermarkets, to which it would later add home 
improvement stores. In 1993, the company introduced 
a new line of business simultaneously in Chile and 
Argentina when it created building materials and home 
improvement stores under the Easy brand name. From 
then until 1998, Cencosud’s growth in Buenos Aires 
was particularly rapid, as it built and ran seven new 
shopping centres, all of which included Jumbo and 
Easy stores. The penetration strategy for Easy was 
even broader, as about half these stores were located 
away from the shopping centres run by Cencosud. This 
was part of a strategy of generating powerful synergies 
between the company’s different lines of business, 
especially in Argentina (figure 4).
During the same period, the department store 
chain Falabella also moved into Argentina, but with a 
considerably more conservative strategy than the one 
used by Cencosud. In 1993, Falabella opened its first 
store in the border town of Mendoza, where people 
were already familiar with the company because of 
the amount of tourist traffic between the two countries. 
Falabella saw Mendoza as offering an opportunity for 
growth with less risk than would have been involved 
in moving directly into Buenos Aires (Bianchi, 2002, 
p. 6). With this initial operation, Falabella became the 
only department store chain to operate in the Argentine 
market (Falabella, 2004b, p. 37).
Despite this privileged position, the results did 
not live up to expectations. Falabella had to deal with 
a complex environment in which legal standards, 
consumer preferences and habits and product import 
facilities were very different from those in Chile. 
FIGURE 4
Cencosud: Number of stores, by business segment and country
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Nevertheless, the company continued its expansion 
into Argentina by opening two new stores, in San Juan 
(1994) and in Córdoba (1997), seeking to generate 
economies of scale that would make its business 
profitable (Bianchi, 2002, p. 6). Its great opportunity to 
consolidate its position in Argentina came a little later, 
however, when Cencosud remodelled the Unicenter 
shopping centre. Falabella then came in as the second 
anchor store alongside Jumbo, thus establishing itself 
in Buenos Aires. As a means of promoting department 
store sales, it also introduced its CMR credit card, along 
with other services such as its travel agency. When it 
began to provide credit, the company’s performance 
started to pick up, and expectations for Falabella’s 
future growth in Argentina  are now high (Falabella, 
2000, p. 17).
In light of its experience in Argentina and the 
difficulties encountered there, Falabella reformulated 
its strategy for entering other markets and began 
to pay greater attention to local idiosyncrasies. In 
1995, encouraged by the Peruvian economy’s growth 
prospects, it entered that market by acquiring the SAGA 
(Sociedad Andina de Grandes Almacenes) department 
store chain, which was well known locally and had 
two stores in Lima, from its Colombian owners. 
The company began operating under the name SAGA 
Falabella, retaining local management and incorporating 
processes and best practices applied in Chile (Bianchi, 
2002, p. 7). The strong position of the SAGA brand, 
the established managers’ knowledge of the market, 
the existence of a department store shopping culture 
and the perception among Peruvian consumers that 
Falabella was a local company meant that it quickly 
achieved positive results (Falabella, 2004b, p. 38). 
As in Argentina, those results were boosted by the 
introduction of the CMR credit card and the company’s 
travel agency, and by the selling of insurance.
In view of Falabella’s success, one of its main rivals 
in Chile, Ripley, began its own internationalization 
process in Peru in 1997. The new competitor reproduced 
the characteristics of the Chilean market by opening its 
first premises in Lima at the Jockey Plaza Shopping 
Center, where Falabella also had a store. In Peru, 
Ripley sought to build up its corporate image among 
higher-income consumers before turning its attention 
to segments with less purchasing power.
In a bid to cope with this new situation, between 
1996 and 1998 Falabella expanded and remodelled its 
existing facilities, opened two new shops in Lima, and 
set up a distribution centre. The company also worked 
to maintain good relations with its Peruvian suppliers 
(almost 50% of its purchases were local), while at 
the same time coordinating closely with the buying 
department in Chile, as a way of creating synergies 
in bulk purchases from foreign suppliers (Bianchi, 
2002, p. 8).
The economic situation in Peru began to 
deteriorate, however, affecting the results of the two 
Chilean firms’ Peruvian subsidiaries. In response, 
both Ripley and Falabella launched new expansion 
drives involving major changes in their strategies. In 
2000, Ripley introduced a new low-price, self-service 
store format (Max). This strategy enabled it to reach 
segments of the Lima population which its competitor 
had yet to approach. Meanwhile, Falabella was also 
opening smaller stores (SAGA Falabella Express), but 
with a view to exploring market potential elsewhere in 
Peru. Thus, the company used a small shop format and 
careful product selection to try to identify the needs 
and preferences of consumers in the northern part of 
the country, while also introducing the CMR credit 
card. Over a short period, Falabella opened premises 
in Trujillo (the largest city in northern Peru) and in 
Chiclayo, Piura and Arequipa.
Coming on top of the difficulties in Peru, the 
sharp downturn in the Argentine economy destabilized 
Falabella’s and Cencosud’s plans. Falabella put a freeze 
on new investment and announced that it would not 
open any more new stores in Argentina, but would 
instead concentrate on improving the commercial 
management and efficiency of its operations (Falabella, 
2001, p. 19 and El Mercurio, 2002). One of the most 
important measures taken by the Chilean firm in 
Argentina was a rapid reduction in the percentage of 
imported merchandise, which it replaced with local 
products more suited to Argentine tastes. This gave 
it a considerable competitive advantage (Falabella, 
2004b, p. 37). Falabella also sought to improve its 
communication strategy and capitalize more on the 
economies of scale generated by its joint operations 
in Chile and Peru (Falabella, 2001, p. 19). Lastly, the 
department store format proved highly convenient and 
flexible for Argentine consumers during the economic 
recession because they could use the CMR credit card 
for their purchases (Falabella, 2004a, p. 14).
Meanwhile, Cencosud continued to grow but, 
unlike Falabella, focused its efforts on expanding its 
real-estate business into other parts of Argentina by 
opening somewhat smaller shopping centres (Neuquén 
and Mendoza) and extending its Easy chain (table 5). 
Cencosud saw an opportunity in the deep economic 
crisis, and while other major operators in the industry 
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were trying to withdraw from the country, the Chilean 
company sought options for continuing growth. 
Although it did experience a significant slump in sales, 
it was clearly confident that the Argentine economy 
would bounce back (figure 5). In 2002, Cencosud 
paid US$ 105 million for the four stores owned by 
the United States chain The Home Depot in Argentina 
(Cencosud, 2003, p. 15).
Cencosud thus became one of Argentina’s largest 
shopping centre management companies11 and the 
leader in the country’s home improvement and building 
stores sector (tables 5 and 6). The devaluation of 
the peso forced Easy to substitute local products for 
imports and use a greater number of local suppliers.12 
TABLE 5
Cencosud: Shopping centres in Argentina, 2005
Opened Shopping centre Leasable  Location  Description
  floor space
  (m2)a
1982 Parque Brown Factory 26 224 Federal capital Jumbo, Easy, 44 stores
1988 Unicenter 91 771 Martínez, Buenos Aires Jumbo, Falabella, 287 stores,
    Aventura, Food Court, 14 cinemas
1993 Lomas Center Factory 33 675 Lomas de Zamora, Buenos Aires Jumbo, Easy, 50 stores, Aventura
1994 San Martín Factory 32 729 San Martín, Buenos Aires Jumbo, Easy, 31 stores, Aventura
1996 Centro Comercial Palermo 29 699 Federal capital  Jumbo, Easy, 43 stores
1997 Quilmes Factory 44 132 Quilmes, Buenos Aires Jumbo, Easy, 47 stores, Aventura,
    Food Court, 12 cinemas
1997 Plaza Oeste Shopping 41 634 Morón, Buenos Aires Jumbo, Easy, 138 stores, Aventura,
    Food Court, 8 cinemas 
1998 Las Palmas del Pilar 49 581 Pilar, Buenos Aires Jumbo, Easy, 102 stores
2000 Portal del Escobar 32 740 Escobar, Buenos Aires Jumbo, Easy, 24 stores
2000 Portal de La Patagonia 33 813 Neuquén Jumbo, Easy, Food Court, 40 stores
2001 Portal de Los Andes 32 563 Godoy Cruz, Mendoza Jumbo, Easy, 30 stores
2004 Portal Rosario 55 000 Rosario Jumbo, Easy, 160 stores,
    Food Court, cinemas
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of information from Cencosud.
a Includes Jumbo and Easy stores.
This situation created an opportunity to introduce 
new products to its subsidiary in Chile, enabling the 
company to reap volume synergies in its purchasing 
(Cencosud, 2004, p. 36).
The troubled economic situation of Argentina and 
Peru in the early 2000s held back the international 
expansion of Chile’s largest retailers, but they did 
succeed in growing and strengthening their position in 
the Chilean market while introducing major changes 
in their business development strategies. Given the 
small size of their domestic market, they realized that 
they could not achieve sufficient scale if they acted 
in just one segment of the industry, so they began to 
broaden and diversify their provision in order to create 
synergies among different but related lines of business. 
Thus, while global operators were specializing and 
standardizing their formats, a new variant began to 
emerge in Chile’s retail industry: integrated retailing.
It was Falabella that took the first steps in this 
direction. In the late 1990s, it moved into the home 
improvement stores segment in partnership with the 
11 The Argentine shopping centre market basically comprises 
two large operators, Cencosud and IRSA-Alto Palermo Centros 
Comerciales, which account for 60% of gross leasable space in 
commercial establishments of this type.
12 Prior to this, some 30% of the products sold in the company’s 
stores were of foreign origin.
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FIGURE 5
Cencosud: Operating revenue, by business segment and country, 2001-2005
(Millions of Chilean pesos)
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of information from Cencosud.
TABLE 6
Retailers: Number of stores, by business segment and country, 2000-2005
 Falabella Cencosud Ripley
 1998 2000 2005 1998 2000 2005 1998 2000 2005
Department stores         
 Chile 26 29 33 - - 21 14 23 31
 Argentina 4 5 6 - - - - - -
 Peru 4 4 10 - - - 1 4 8
Home improvement         
 Chile 2 5 54 2 3 16 - - -
 Argentina - - - 8 14 26 - - -
 Peru - - 2 - - - - - -
 Colombia - - 9 - - - - - -
Supermarkets         
 Chile - - 11 3 4 119 - - -
 Argentina - - - 8 10 248 - - -
 Peru - - 3 - - - - - -
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of information from Falabella, Cencosud and Ripley.
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United States firm The Home Depot and acquired 
20% of Farmacias Ahumada (FASA), a specialist 
company with an interesting growth strategy. In 2001, 
Falabella bought out its partner, The Home Depot, 
and created HomeStore. Two years later, it merged 
HomeStore with Sodimac, Chile’s largest operator in the 
segment. This operation indirectly boosted Falabella’s 
internationalization, thanks to Sodimac’s presence in 
Colombia.13 Falabella subsequently expanded into the 
supermarket segment, first establishing itself in Peru 
with the creation of the Tottus hypermarket chain and 
then quickly applying this experience in Chile.14 
Not to be outdone, Cencosud began to implement 
a similar strategy. First, it sought to extend the 
geographical coverage of its supermarket chain in Chile 
and diversify its format. To that end, it bought up a 
number of local operators: Santa Isabel, Las Brisas 
and Montecarlo (Cencosud, 2005, p. 13). Then, in 
March 2005, Cencosud made its boldest play, taking 
over Almacenes París, Chile’s third-largest department 
store chain after Falabella and Ripley.15 As a result, 
like Falabella, Cencosud has established a broadly 
based retail business that will enable it to generate 
synergies and complementarities between its different 
assets, especially with the non-banking credit business 
—Cencosud (Jumbo) and Almacenes París have about 
4 million credit card holders between them— and with 
Banco París.
Cencosud and Falabella thus appear to have cut 
several years off the process of developing an integrated 
model for supermarkets and department stores (a 
strategy which has also been successfully implemented 
by the Spanish chain El Corte Inglés). Again, while 
the integrated retail concept has been applied most 
intensively in the domestic market, this new strategy 
began to be implemented outside Chile as well when 
the economic situation in a number of Latin American 
countries improved, and Falabella and Cencosud have 
shown great interest in continued expansion into 
relatively undeveloped market segments or niches in 
other countries of the region.
In less than two years, Falabella has very 
successfully replicated its business model in Peru, 
opening three Tottus hypermarkets, two Sodimac 
Homecenter home improvement stores (with six 
more planned for the next two years) (Sodimac, 2005, 
p. 24), and four new SAGA Falabella department stores 
(table 6). In Argentina, it hopes to gain a new impetus 
with the opening of two new department stores in a 
major street (calle Florida) in central Buenos Aires (La 
Nación, 2005 and Falabella, 2005, p. 20). In Colombia, 
it plans to open three new Sodimac stores and four 
Falabella department stores, a format that is almost 
non-existent in that country.16 Indeed, Falabella has 
announced that it will invest some US$ 1.13 billion 
over the next four years (Falabella, 2006, p. 11) to 
double the number of retail outlets of all formats in 
Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Peru (table 7). The 
company is also looking for new opportunities in 
Ecuador and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
(Business Latin America, 2005), thereby making 
explicit its aim of becoming a major regional player. 
All this has turned it into one of the 10 fastest-growing 
retailers in the world (Deloitte, 2006, p. 15).
With the first signs of recovery in Argentina, 
Cencosud saw a chance to increase its market share and 
expand the geographical coverage of its operations in 
that country by buying the Disco supermarket chain, 
13 In 1994, the original owners of Sodimac formed a joint venture 
with the local group Corona to introduce the Homecenter franchise 
in Colombia. Falabella currently owns 35% of the joint operation 
and runs eight stores, and has thus achieved nationwide coverage 
and consolidated its position as the leader of the sector in Colombia 
(Sodimac, 2005, p. 25).
14 In 2004, Falabella entered the supermarket business in Chile by 
acquiring 88% of Supermercados San Francisco, the country’s third 
largest chain, for US$ 62.5 million.
15 On 31 August 2005, shareholders’ meetings of both companies 
approved the merger of Cencosud and Almacenes París, the latter 
being taken over by the former.
16 Falabella intends to invest some US$ 100 million for this purpose 
together with the Corona group, its partner in Sodimac (El Mercurio, 
2005a).
TABLE 7




Cencosud 2006-2010 1 200
Falabella 2006-2009 1 130
Ripley 2006-2007 551
D&S 2006-2009 800
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of information from 
company reports.
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the second largest in Argentina, from Royal Ahold, 
which was in serious difficulties.17 It very soon began 
to show what it was capable of in Argentina, where 
it was competing with the two global leaders, Wal-
Mart and Carrefour, achieving a 22% market share 
by early 2005. Furthermore, following the acquisition 
of Almacenes París, the company decided to step up 
the internationalization of its department store format 
by building on its platform of shopping centres in 
Argentina.18 Cencosud expects to double its annual 
sales to over US$ 10 billion by 2010, positioning 
itself as the industry’s fourth-largest operator in Latin 
America behind Wal-Mart, Carrefour and Casino. 
To that end, it plans to invest some US$ 1.2 billion, 
financed basically through internal cash generation. 
In addition to growth in Chile, Cencosud aims to 
increase the number of its Easy stores in Argentina 
from 26 to 50 and to open between seven and nine 
new Almacenes París stores (table 7). It also wishes 
to expand into a third country at the same time, and 
is looking at opportunities in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru (La 
Tercera, 2006a).
Ripley has not been left behind either, but has 
continued to seek opportunities for diversification 
and may follow Falabella’s lead by entering the 
supermarket segment in Peru before turning to the 
Chilean market. The company has announced a new 
push in its international expansion and is targeting 
other Latin American countries that have potential and 
are of “manageable” size, the main contenders being 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia and 
Ecuador (El Mercurio, 2005b). Notwithstanding, Ripley 
has also expressed interest in entering larger markets 
such as Brazil and Mexico (La Tercera, 2006b). The 
company plans to invest over US$ 550 million for this 
purpose (table 7).
The Chilean model has also been followed by 
other operators in Latin America. In Colombia, for 
example, Falabella and Carrefour have joined forces 
to manage their own consumer credit system, while 
the local chain Carulla Vivero has attempted to do the 
same with Ripley (América economía, 2006a, p. 92). 
This latter partnership has suffered a delay because the 
Colombian chain Almacenes Éxito may be acquiring 
part of Carulla Vivero (La Tercera, 2006b).
With this track record, it seems logical that the 
leading Chilean retail companies should continue to 
expand their presence, both in the different segments 
of the industry and geographically. Accordingly, they 
have already announced ambitious investment plans 
for the coming years. These companies’ past and 
future expansion plans have required complex financial 
engineering to meet the financial requirements of this 
process by combining equity, bank credits, bonds 
and new share issues. Nevertheless, their borrowing 
has remained within acceptable limits. Cencosud is 
the company that has faced the greatest difficulties, 
as its recent aggressive expansion plan left it heavily 
indebted; it has managed to turn the situation around 
rapidly, however.19
In sum, boosted by the growth of the local 
economy and, especially, by private consumption trends, 
the revenues of the large Chilean retail chains have 
expanded steadily. This is reflected in the substantial 
investments announced for the next few years, in 
the pace at which new stores are being opened and 
in the expansion of agreements for the use of credit 
instruments. Thus, these companies have consolidated 
and expanded their participation in the markets where 
they operate. The big chains have increased their 
presence by taking over smaller operators, thereby 
significantly increasing the degree of concentration in 
the domestic market. Notwithstanding this trend, there 
is no clear evidence that competition has suffered. 
Indeed, consumers have mostly enjoyed lower prices.
17 In early 2004, Cencosud successfully completed its first issue of 
shares and American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), equivalent to 
21% of its holding, thereby raising US$ 332 million. Using these 
funds, it struck an agreement with Royal Ahold some months later 
to acquire an 85% share in Argentina’s second-largest supermarket 
chain, Disco S.A., for about US$ 315 million. After numerous legal 
battles, the operation was finally concluded, although the merger 
with Jumbo could not take place (El Clarín, 2005). Thus, during an 
especially difficult period, following the purchase of Disco and the 
remodelling of the Jumbo stores (in which it invested over US$ 500 
million), Cencosud became the second-largest supermarket operator 
in Argentina (Cencosud, 2005 and Estrategia, 2004).
18 As with Jumbo and Easy, Cencosud plans to open an Almacenes 
París store in each of its shopping centres in Argentina. This process 
was to begin in early 2006 with the opening of a store at Unicenter 
in Buenos Aires, to compete with Falabella (La Nación, 2005).
19 A capital increase was approved in January 2005, and this was 
used to fund part of the takeover of Almacenes París. Including the 
liabilities of Almacenes París, Cencosud’s financial debt stands at 
US$ 1.156 billion, of which 40% is repayable in the short term. In 
June 2005, Cencosud sold 38.6% of Disco and Jumbo in Argentina 
to various institutional funds for US$ 130 million and subsequently 
implemented a US$ 550 million liability refinancing plan. This 
operation allowed the company to extend the maturity profile of over 
half its financial liabilities (Cencosud, 2006, p. 8).
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 0  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 6 165
THE EXPANSION MODEL OF THE MAJOR CHILEAN RETAIL CHAINS  •  ÁLVARO CALDERÓN HOFFMANN
The market leaders still have room for further 
growth, which would seem to indicate that the industry 
is far from having reached maturity. In this respect, 
two central trends have emerged: (i) the search for 
synergies between different retail segments and formats 
to make up for the small size of the Chilean market; and 
(ii) the use of selective and gradual internationalization 
strategies to expand the market. The first of these trends 
has enabled the leading companies to consolidate their 
position in the domestic market, check the expansion of 
international chains and acquire highly valuable know-
how in the management of related businesses, especially 
in the increasingly important financial segment. On the 
strength of this experience, the leading companies 
in the sector have moved with particular success 
into certain external markets, thus opening up new 
potential to scale up their business. Their international 
experience has also enabled the leading operators to 
assimilate new elements, such as local characteristics 
and supplier relationships, into their overall strategies. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that greater international 
exposure will mean increased competition with global 
operators, which could introduce greater uncertainty 
into the potential for Chilean companies to sustain 
these strategies. 
IV
Specialist retailing: A record of success
in fragmented markets
In contrast to the leading retail companies, which have 
grown rapidly by expanding the range of their business 
and their geographical coverage, Chile also offers 
interesting examples of a completely opposing logic: 
specialization in a particular segment of the industry. 
This is the case with certain chains of pharmacies and 
home improvement stores, such as Farmacias Ahumada 
(FASA) and Casa&Ideas.20
In 35 years or so, FASA has grown from a traditional 
pharmacy to the largest chain of pharmacies in Latin 
America and one of the 10 largest in the world, with 
operations in Chile, Peru, Mexico and, until recently, 
Brazil (FASA, 2005, p. 7; Chain Drug Review, 2002). It 
is also one of the few companies in the world to have 
successfully implemented an internationalization strategy 
in this particular segment of the retail market, whose 
leader is the British company Boots Group PLC.
In recent years, Chile’s pharmacies have been 
undergoing intensive consolidation in a highly 
competitive environment, with the three largest 
operators having a combined market share of 90% 
(see table 4). Unlike its competitors, FASA realized 
that the shrinking market share of independent 
pharmacies and the consequent consolidation of the 
chains would translate into fewer opportunities for 
growth within Chile. The company therefore embarked 
upon an active internationalization process, seeking 
out new markets that would offer profitable growth 
and enable it to benefit from the synergies generated 
by its size and experience (FASA, 2005, p. 7). Entering 
highly fragmented and dispersed markets, FASA was 
able to expand its market share rapidly, thanks to 
cost advantages resulting from its greater volume of 
business, the implementation of technological and 
logistical improvements, and marketing campaigns 
(FASA, 2002, p. 29 and 2003, p. 49).
FASA began its internationalization drive in 1996 
when it entered the Peruvian market, setting up the 
Boticas FASA S.A. pharmacy chain in a joint venture 
with local investors. In 2000, together with AIG 
Capital Partners Inc., it acquired 77% of Drogamed, 
the largest pharmacy chain in the Brazilian state of 
Paraná, for US$ 25 million. A year later, in order to 
take full control of its affiliates in Peru and Brazil, 
FASA acquired 15% of Boticas FASA and, jointly with 
AIG, 23% of Drogamed. In early 2005, FASA bought 
the remaining 35% of Drogamed from AIG, turning it 
into a wholly-owned subsidiary (figure 6).
20 The experience of Casa&Ideas is more recent and more limited 
in scope. In 1993, Casa started trading with two stores in Santiago; 
five years later, it was replaced by Casa&Ideas, with a new corporate 
image and a new business concept: affordable design for all. In 2005, 
following huge success in Chile, the company ventured abroad with 
the opening of two stores in Lima, Peru. Casa&Ideas currently has 
26 stores in Chile and three in Peru.
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In December 2002, FASA acquired a majority 
interest in the Mexican company Far-Ben S.A. de C.V. 
through the subscription and payment of a US$ 45 million 
capital increase. The Mexican chain was going through 
a profound crisis and needed a strategic partner to 
turn around its financial situation (América economía, 
2006b, p. 46). In 2003, FASA consolidated its operations 
by successfully taking over Farmacias Benavides 
in Monterrey, Mexico. This doubled the size of the 
business in terms of sales, customers and the number 
of outlets (see figure 4).
Thus, by using different internationalization 
strategies tailored to each market, from entirely new 
operations in Peru (Boticas FASA) to the takeover of 
chains in Brazil and Mexico (Drogamed and Farmacias 
Benavides), FASA has been able to expand its operations 
substantially in record time. After more than eight 
years of international expansion, over 60% of the 
company’s consolidated operational earnings now 
come from abroad and over 71% of its customers are 
outside Chile.
This international expansion effort has not been 
trouble-free, however, particularly in Brazil. In fact, 
the operation in that country was largely responsible 
for the deterioration in the company’s profits from 
US$ 10.5 million in 2001 to US$ 2.5 million in 
2002. The fragmentation of the Brazilian market 
made it difficult to operate a chain like FASA and, 
despite large capital injections, debts were increasing 
and the operations showed no sign of recovery. 
Moreover, competition in Chile was becoming stiffer, 
resulting in a six point loss of market share between 
2003 and 2005 (América economía, 2006b, p. 47). 
FASA therefore decided to withdraw from Brazil. In 
January 2006, following five years of losses, it sold 
its Brazilian subsidiary to the then executive president 
of Drogamed. Complicated regulations, high taxes and 
commissions, competition from the informal economy 
and the difficulty of adapting to local consumption 
patterns had turned its operations in Brazil, the world’s 
sixth-largest consumer of pharmaceutical products, 
into a nightmare (Qué Pasa, 2006).
In summary, faced with intense, unremitting 
competition in the Chilean market, FASA decided to 
expand its operations abroad on the strength of the 
experience it had built up in Chile and the relative 
underdevelopment of external markets. Other than in 
Brazil, the outcome has been successful, making this one 
of the few companies in the world to have internationalized 
its pharmaceutical retailing operations.
FIGURE 6
Farmacias Ahumada: Number of outlets, by country, 1998-2005
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Chilean retailers have achieved significant competitive 
advantages using a business model based on synergies 
between a number of related activities, a strong customer 
orientation and a powerful financial dimension. This 
strategy has given companies a solid base in the local 
market, enabling them to head off efforts by some 
of the major international operators to enter what is 
one of the most attractive destinations for the retail 
industry in the developing world. The development of 
this integrated retail formula was the direct result of 
intense competition in the Chilean market, whose small 
size made it very difficult to run a profitable operation 
in just one segment of the retail industry. Accordingly, 
Chilean companies progressively developed a full 
range of integrated retail operations, based on six 
main pillars: department stores, home improvement 
stores, supermarkets, credit card administration, 
financial services provided through their own banks, 
and real estate. The key to success was a combination 
of best international practice with knowledge of local 
conditions, a diversif ied product range including 
banking services, and the ability to survive in a highly 
competitive market.
Following their success in the local market, 
and alert to the first signs of saturation, retailers 
saw international expansion as the best option for 
sustainable growth. Their internationalization has been 
gradual and limited to neighbouring countries, which 
has enabled them to gain experience of operating in 
other markets without major traumas. Indeed, some of 
the approaches developed in the Chilean market have 
been emulated by other operators in the region.
Chilean companies have applied the central 
elements of their domestic market strategies to their 
international expansion, adapted somewhat to enable 
them to tune in to local consumer habits and needs 
and win acceptance. To this end, they have sought out 
local partners, established long-term relationships with 
suppliers and recruited local staff whenever possible in 
the countries where they have invested. Many of these 
changes were implemented during economic crises in 
the countries concerned, and this enabled the companies 
to take advantage of new opportunities and acquire 
assets from transnational corporations that were unable 
to weather the situation and grasp the peculiarities of 
local consumers.
The leading Chilean operators have recently 
been facing new challenges in the domestic market, 
particularly where supermarkets are concerned. In 
the first place, the restrictions imposed by Chile’s 
competition authority, the Tribunal de Defensa de la 
Libre Competencia (TDLC), on continued growth in 
the Chilean market via acquisition of smaller chains, 
together with the regulation of these operators’ 
relationships with their suppliers, will help to keep a 
check on market concentration and prevent abusive 
conduct. Secondly, the new standards laid down by the 
Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions 
(SBIF) for credit cards issued by retail operators will 
regulate the provision and use of these non-bank 
payment facilities, preventing companies from levying 
excessive interest and charges. Although it means 
tighter restrictions than in the past, the new situation 
does not appear too problematic for local companies. 
While some of them may see their profit margins fall, 
their efficiency will increase and their relationships with 
their customers and suppliers will improve significantly. 
There is surely no impediment to their continuing to 
improve the quality of their internal management and 
looking with fresh enthusiasm at the opportunities for 
more ambitious international expansion.
The model developed by Chilean companies 
would also be applicable to medium-sized economies 
where major international operators such as Wal-Mart 
and Carrefour have not been very successful or have 
not shown any interest. This could be risky, however, 
as the subregional chains being set up by Chilean 
companies in rapidly consolidating markets could 
become prime targets for global operators wishing to 
position themselves quickly and on a sound footing in 
Latin America. A case in point is Wal-Mart’s recent 
acquisition of the CARHC chain in Central America.
V
Conclusions
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